There exists a commonly-accepted view about why governments charter banks to serve as their exclusive financial agent. In that view, a government chooses to grant a single institution a monopoly over its borrowing because a monopolist can credibly punish defaults by denying future credit, whereas multiple creditors would be unable to sustain a boycott. The result is more credit for the government, and more security for its creditors. The Bank of England was born in such an arrangement. 1 We do not know much, however, about cases where the government makes such a deal and then reneges. Should its demand for credit rise, its time horizon fall, or new sources of credit become available, the government has incentives to borrow from third parties, or even default on its debts.
2 If the government then defaults on its debts, how can it receive credit in the future? It would have to provide very high returns to creditors. The government cannot simply pay higher rates, however, because creditors know that the higher the cost of borrowing, the more incentive a debtor has to default in the future.
Rather than pay higher interest rates, however, the government can create arrangements that allow its creditors to compensate themselves for the risk of lending to the government by extracting rents from the rest of society. How might such an arrangement work? Mexico provides an example. Mexico's weak central government was incapable of raising the tax revenues it needed. It could not resort to international borrowing: Mexico's previous international bond issues were in default. In order to solve this problem, in 1880 the government chartered a bank that would finance to the government. Yet despite issuing illegal debts and 1 The logic behind this is discussed in Bulow and Rogoff, "A Constant Recontracting Model"; and Weingast, "The Political Foundations."
2 New sources of credit, for example, or threats which shorten the sovereign's time horizon, such as war or political instability, have prompted sovereign defaults. See North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment, " p. 807 . Political instability also shortens the time horizons of despotic governments, making them less likely to respect their own agreements. For examples, see Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development"; and DeLong and Shleifer, "Princes and Merchants." then defaulting in 1884-85, the government succeeded in getting the very same bank to lend it new money in 1886 and underwrite its return to international credit markets in 1888.
Mexico persuaded its creditors to continue to provide it loans by enabling them to extract rents from the rest of the Mexican economy. These rents came in three forms. First, Mexico's creditors, organized into the Banco Nacional de México (Banamex), were granted special privileges in the banking market. Second, they were given the keys to the mintliterally. The country's mints were turned over to the bank. Third, Banamex was given the right to administer and collect certain taxes, including customs and excise taxes. Banamex's branch network gave it an advantage over the government in collecting taxes. 3 In other words, the Mexican government compensated its creditors for the risk of lending to it by enabling them to extract rents from the rest of the economy. The returns from these rents were so high that the government's creditors would earn a positive return as long as the government refrained from confiscating all their liquid assets more than twice a decade.
Protecting Banamex's privileges in the banking market was easy even for Mexico's relatively disorganized government. All Porfirio Díaz had to do was fail to enforce the property rights and contracts of any potential competitors. Díaz's government, as a practical matter, lacked the capability to provide property rights as a public good. It could, however, selectively and differentially enforce the property rights of particular private parties. All other things being equal, the more clearly-defined and better-enforced the rights to use or transfer an asset, the greater the value of that asset. Banamex, by enjoying better (if still not particu-larly good by the standards of, say, contemporary England) defined and enforced property rights than its competitors, could enjoy a very large competitive advantage over them. 5 In some respects, the relationship between Banamex and the Mexican government is similar to the arrangement that existed between the tax farming cartel of the Ferme Générale and the Crown in the eighteenth-century France. Johnson, "Banking on the King," provides a model of tax farming in the presence of transaction costs of collection. Johnson's model suggests that the explanation behind the French transition, at the end of the 17 th century, from competitive auctioning of tax farms to a monopoly cartel is the need to invest in specific taxcollection infrastructure and technology. The multiple monopolies enjoyed by the tax farmer were essential to its relative immunity from government predation. Like Banamex, the Ferme Générale amounted to a tax farming monopoly which doubled as a creditor for the government. The Ferme Générale extracted revenue from the population and forwarded it to the government. The exposure to predation by the government was limited, since, in the absence of other organizations in the ready with the infrastructure, expertise and financial re-In the long term, the result was an uncompetitive financial system and slower economic growth. 6 In the short term, however, the result was financial stability, and a government ca- Mexico's foreign creditors in 1878, when they agreed link the renewal of debt service to future railroad growth. In the words of the Finance Secretary, Matías Romero:
It does not appear too hazardous to assert that, if railroads were constructed in the center of the country, and between the principal towns … in order to have access to both oceans, the nation would receive an impulse such that its wealth would be sensibly augmented, and with it the income of the Federal Treasury, which would admit of the punctual payment of the interest on the national debt. The credi- 13 Coatsworth, Growth Against Development, p. 35. 14 See Maurer, "Banks and Entrepreneurs."
tors of the country appear to have recognized the truth and force of these considerations.
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Mexico's existing sources of credit were not sufficient. A money market of sorts existed in Mexico City. The federal government issued customs certificates. These certificates entitled the bearer to physically go to a specific customhouse and collect a stated amount. Gross issues of customs certificates rose precipitously between 1876 and 1882. (See Table 2 .)
Most funds, however, were paid back in six months, and net long-term borrowing was zero until 1882. Before then, railroad subsidies came out of the military budget, a dangerous policy in a country prone to regional revolts and military coups. If the government were to build railroads quickly, it needed to borrow more than this thin market could finance. (See Table 3 .)
(TABLES 2 AND 3 AROUND HERE)
There is no evidence that the Mexican government considered printing money to cover its deficit. There is a reason for that: inflationary finance had not been particularly successful elsewhere in Latin America. Argentina provides an example. On multiple occasions, Argentine governments filled fiscal shortfalls by printing money. None of these episodes raised revenues for more than a few years, and all were followed by painful efforts to re-establish convertibility. The mechanism behind inflationary finance in Argentina was not the issuance of government fiat money. Argentine governments (like Mexican ones) lacked the credibility to force people to accept its notes. Rather, the mechanism was to establish private banks that would issue notes redeemable in gold, and then suspend the convertibility of those notes. 16 It was, in short, not unlike issuing interest-free bonds with a promise to repay in the future. Even had the Mexican government wanted to follow the Argentine example, it could not have persuaded the public to accept its note issues because it had already defaulted on its debts and its bonds traded for as little as 8 centavos on the peso. The only recourse creditors had to induce repayment was the threat of denying future credit. Therefore, the largest penalty which they could impose upon the Mexican government was the present value of any future borrowing. 26 It is difficult, however, for multiple lenders to effectively enforce a credit boycott. Boycotts hurt lenders almost as much as they hurt borrowers. The government will be denied credit, but its creditors will be denied the opportunity to make profitable loans. 27 With a multiplicity of lenders, the government can default on some while continuing to borrow from others. In fact, the government has no incentive not to default on any single lender. After all, the marginal value of the last loan the government takes at the prevailing interest rate was presumably zero, and therefore so is the cost of default and alienating that particular creditor.
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Of course, lenders are presumably alert to this sort of thing. Therefore, one would expect lenders to organize a boycott if the government began defaulting on only some of it debts. Unfortunately, collective boycotts are not credible without an enforcement mechanism. This is because the government can offer extraordinarily good terms to violators. The more restrictive the boycott, the greater the government's need for credit, and the more credible its offers of good terms for violators. The value of the punishment lenders can levy on the government will be low, and so will be its credit limit.
Therefore, by concentrating its borrowing in a single institution, the government can raise the amount of pain caused by a default, since a single lender can credibly impose a credit boycott. The result, in theory, is an increase in the government's ability to borrow.
The rub is that the government has no binding ex post reason to limit its borrowing. (See Table 3 .) The government began issuing customs certificates faster than it redeemed them. It also requested advances from Mexico's other banks, in contravention of its agreement with the Banco Nacional. Changes in tariff schedules kept the deficit from growing in The agreement gave Banamex a monopoly over all lending to the federal government.
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The bank was also exempted from all federal taxes, except the stamp tax, while the government promised to subject the other banks to a 5% tax on banknote issues. Banamex received the right to issue banknotes up to three times the amount of its reserves, which could consist of federal bonds in addition to specie. Its competitors were limited to a ratio of two pesos in notes for every peso of vault specie. 41 The government also agreed to turn over half of the revenue of the Progreso, San Blas, and Mazatlán customhouses directly to the bank.
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In return, Banamex opened a four million peso credit line to the government, and soon offered more. Several Congressional deputies bitterly opposed the contract, objecting against the £1.3 million-roughly 20%-commission charged by Banamex. As Carlos Marichal has pointed out, these commissions were probably intended to cover the government's outstanding seven million peso debt to the bank. Nevertheless, before a final vote could be taken, hundreds of students took to the streets chanting, "Die, Manuel González! Die, Noetzlin!" Two people were killed and hundreds injured in the resulting riot.
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Neither González nor Noetzlin died, but the contract did. Mexico City was in the midst of bitter in-fighting over who should succeed Manuel González. Porfirio Díaz presumably had little incentive to help his protégé-cum-opponent resolve the country's credit problems.
Díaz regained the presidency, and he informed Noetzlin that both the contract and commission were dead.
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The failure of the Noetzlin contract failed to shrink the government's demand for credit.
Banamex charged the government an effective interest rate of 39.4% on a 300,000 peso ad- vance made to make loan payments due in New York in January 1885. 48 In March the government illegally borrowed Mx$1,094,201 from Banamex through the expedient of not paying money orders drawn on New York. 49 In April the bank's board approved a further 300,000 peso "emergency" loan to the government. Table 4 .) Its directors "agreed" to give the government until June 1886 to resume payments. In point of fact, the bank had little choice.
(TABLE 4 AROUND HERE)
Within a year, however, Banamex opened new credits to the federal government. 54 In 1888, the bank aided the government in converting its outstanding foreign and domestic debts into new bonds at much lower interest rate. In 1893, it underwrote the government's first fresh borrowing on international capital markets in a half-century. 48 Calculated from data in the AHBNM, 13 January 1885, Actas de consejo, vol. 2. The price of silver fell in 1884-85, causing the peso to depreciate strongly, falling from 89¢ (US) to 85¢. It would continue to fall until 1888, when it would pause at 75¢ before beginning to decline again in 1892. 
PROFITS
Why did the bank choose to aid the federal government? After all, Banamex had been seriously burned by the government's suspension of payments and the subsequent bank run.
Why risk good money after bad?
Banamex had three reasons. First, Banamex was, in effect, empowered to collect taxes on the government's behalf. Banamex became the official financial agent of the federal government, which meant that all tax payments and disbursements passed through its hands.
In addition, Banamex held all deposits made as guarantees of government contracts. The bank's directors collected a 3 percent commission on these funds. 55 In fact, Banamex was given the right to collect or administer some taxes directly. In 1885, the government mortgaged 10 percent of all customs revenue (staring on July 1 st , 1886) to the bank. 56 In 1888, the administration of (and revenues from) the Veracruz customhouse and national lottery were given to Banamex. 57 In 1893, it was granted the right to the revenues from all federal excise taxes on alcohol in return for a loan of £267,500 to pay for railroad subsidies. 58 In 1893, in return for a loan of 2.5 million pesos, Banamex was granted administrative control over the federal mints. Banamex promised to continue kicking back to the government what it had previously earned from the mints (4.41% for silver pesos and 4.618% for gold), but believed it could run the operation much more efficiently.
59
In other words, the government's chief creditor became, in effect, a tax farmer.
These arrangments benefitted the government as well as the bank. The share of alcohol taxes in all internal taxes doubled the year Banamex took over their collection. 60 Federal revenues from coinage increased more than sevenfold in the years following Banamex's takeover. In short, not only did the government gain from these arrangements by gaining access to credit; it also improved its fiscal position directly.
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( How high were Banamex's profits? The answer is: extremely high. (See Table 6 and Table 7 .) The bank earned an average return on equity of 24 percent. By 1888, the bank's owners had earned back their entire eight-million peso investment. As might be expected, the bank paid out the majority of its profits in dividends, and reinvested very little.
(TABLE 6 AND 7 AROUND HERE)
During the 1880s, Mexico was an inflationary economy as the silver peso depreciated against gold. The figures in Table 7 Mexico faced a severe dilemma in the 1880s. The government needed to finance an army, build a railroad net, and bring political stability to the country. This required a great deal of money. Unfortunately, the government's ability to extract taxes was limited. Without taxes, the government could not pay tax collectors; without tax collectors, the government could not collect taxes.
The only way to square the circle was to borrow. Unfortunately, in order to borrow, Mexico needed to solve the commitment problem. Since the government had come to power in a military coup in 1876 and faced strong opposition, no one believed it would be long-lived. In addition, Mexico had a long history of debt defaults. The regime tried to create a credible commitment by giving one credit institution a monopoly over lending to the government. Unfortunately, the government could not implement this solution effectively.
As its demand for credit grew, the government borrowed from third parties and eventually defaulted on its debt. Its need for funds remained, but it remained unable to directly extract significant rents from the economy.
The solution was to contract with an institution that would be capable of extracting such rents. The government could not issue banknotes, because with no specie reserves and a debt in default it could not convince anyone to accept them. Banamex's wealthy owners, however, had specie reserves. The government could not run the mint efficiently. Banamex, however, could. The government lacked the capital to enter the banking business. It could, however, grant lucrative special privileges to someone who did. It short, the government could sell a stream of rents to wealthy private parties in return for credit. These rents compensated Banamex for the risk of doing business with an unstable government.
The arrangement was suboptimal in some abstract economic sense. 73 It was not, however, necessarily bad for Mexico. Given Mexico's political instability, it is not clear that alternative strategies would have been feasible. The government it could barely keep up the payments on its existing debt, let alone contract new debts at the usurious rates that would have been necessary. Foregoing new credit would have also meant foregoing the construction of a national rail net and a strong federal army, which would have resulted in more political instability and economic stagnation. Historical contingency made the second-best solution the only feasible solution. Given Mexico's history, the political generation and distribution of rents to a select group was better than the alternative of continued chaos. 
